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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J\llTSIC SERVICE CORPORATION, 
A Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
YS 
CLEO \V ALrrON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
10704 
AP·P·ELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This i::; an action to quiet title to real property in 
plaintiff, for trespass by defendant on said real property 
eausing damage to plaintiff and for removal of def end-
ant's encroachment upon said real property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Court, without a jury, entered judgment quiet-
ing title to the disputed property in the defendant and 
along a chain link fence following a described course; 
disrni::;sing plaintiff's claim for damages and defendant's 
conntPr-('laim for damages. 
1 
HELIEF SOlTG IIT ON" APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment of the 
Trial Court in the order of this Court quieting title to 
the disputed property in the plaintiff. Plaintiff then seeks 
a remand of the case to the lower Court for ih; decision 
on the amount of damages suffered by plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff purchased certain real property belonging 
to "White Investment Company from that said company. 
(R. 50, Ex P-2) "White Investment Company had pur-
chased said property from a Mr. C. vV. 'Wilkins and his 
wife. (R. 49, Ex. P-1) The principal portion of said prop-
erty was located south of 39th South at approximately 
Central A venue. The property sold to plaintiff included 
a strip of land 11..±8 feet "wide running from 3900 South 
south to the principal portion. This strip of land is the 
property in dispute in this action. Purchase of the striv 
was necessary in order to give plaintiff access to tlw 
principal portion of the property as access from Central 
Avenue vvas blocked by a large, marshy bog and was an 
essential access for development of the principal portion. 
( R. 73) 
The> strip ran between property owned by a Mr. P. L. 
Jfonderson on tlw east and the> property uwned h:Y the 
defendant on the 'vest. \Vhen Mr. Hendt,rson pm·chast-d 
his property in February of 1960, the Jisputed prnperty 
was bounded on either side by two wi r~, frncPs. ( R 8:2) 
Both of the surveyors who testified at tlw trial, ~Ir. 
Bush for plaintiff and l\Ir. Coon for defendant, stated 
2 
that when tliey had surveyed tht• pro1wrty m 1959, 
tlw strip was bounded by the two wire fences and was 
unoccnpiPd. (R 59, 99, 101) 
Shortly after .Mr. Henderson purchased his prop-
t'rty, he removed the two wire fences and built a new 
chain link fenee along a line which he decided ·would 
servP as the west boundary of his property. (R. 85) 
'rhat line was and is actually the east boundary of the 
strip in dis1rnte. 
'l'lw east boundary of the defendant's property was 
approximately 10 to 12 feet ·west of the chain link fence. 
( R. G-t) Nevertheless, some time after Mr. Hende.rson 
had Prected the chain link f PncP, defendant proceeded to 
move his personal property, principally car bodies, (Ex. 
P-8), onto the property in dispute and did occupy the 
land up to tlw chain link fence and continues to so occupy. 
:J[r. I-lenderson had, by Quit-claim Deed (Ex. P--1), 
deeded any interest he had in the disputed property to 
plaintiff's predecessor. Subsequent to plaintiff's pur-
ehase from \Yhite Investment Company plaintiff pur-
ehased tlw property to the east of the property in dispute 
omwd h.'-' J\lr. Henderson. 
Fpon lPaming that defondant had occupied the prop-
1•rty in dispute pnrehased from \Vhite Investment Com-
;1an~1, plaintiff made demand upon defendant to cease 
saicl occupaney and cl0ar the strip. Defendant refused 
:md this aetion was commc•n('ed on June 10, 1965. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAS TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN 
DISPUTE. 
The only contracts and deeds which were introduced 
at the trial were introduced by the plaintiff (Exhibit 
Index R-31). They show that the plaintiff acquired his 
interest in the disputed property by a Uniform Real 
l<jstate Contract from White Investment Company (R. 
51, Ex. P. 2). 'Vhite Investment Company obtained fee 
title by deed from C. \V. 'Vilkins and his wife (R. -19, 
Ex. P-1). At the time the plaintiff took possession of 
the property in dispute it was bounded by fenres and 
there were no encroachments. (R-51) Plaintiff then ex-
amined a qualified engineer 'vho produced a plat he had 
surveyed from the deed and the plat was introduced into 
evidence. (R. 58, p. 5) 
At no time in the proceedings did the defendant 
challenge the validity of plaintiff's record title or intro-
duce any evidence to show that he had record title. There-
fore, under the case of Cottrell v. Pickering, 32 Utah 62, 
88 P. 696, (1907) plaintiff must prevail. In that case the 
respondent plaintiff introduced in evidence a deed des-
cribing the parcel of land claimed by him, a survey made 
by a competent engineer identifying the property des-
cribed in the deed and proved possession in himself under 
the deed and rested. 'l1he 1Court said: 
''It may also be conceded that in order to prov<:> a 
perfect or complete titlP thP plaintiff must con-
nect his title with the original source of title, 
nnlPss both he and his adversary claim from a 
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eomrnon source, in which event it is sufficient to 
trace his title back to the common source. But 
the question here presented is whether the re-
spondent was required to show a perfect chain of 
paper title in order to successfully resist the mo-
tion for nonsuit. This seems to be the contention 
of counsel for appellant. \Ve think that all that 
was required of respondent was to show a prima 
facie title as against appellant. This we think, 
respondent did when he produced his deed and in 
connection therewith a survey clearly identify-
ing the premises and showing pssession under or 
pnrsnant to the deed. The deed and survey estab-
lished the extent and boundaries of respondent's 
premises and his possession under the deed cer-
tainly was some evidence of title to all the land 
ineluded within the boundaries .... As against a 
mPre technical objection by any one who, at the 
time the objection is made, appears to be a mere 
stranger to the title, such a prima facie title 
would sePm quite sufficient. To require more 
against such an objector would require everyone 
to prove a pprfed chain of title or against every 
stranger making any kind of a claim. This the 
law dors not require. If the objector has a better 
or stronger title than the prima facie title pre-
vails." 
'T'lw only other evidence of record title to the land 
m question came from P. L. Henderson but he gave a 
quitclaim Deed to plaintiff's predecessor. {P-4) This 
dPed prevails above any prior oral agreement that may 
have hePn made by Henderson with a third party under 
the ease of Campbell v. Nelson, 101 Utah 523, 125 P. 2d 
-1-13, (1932). In that casP the plaintiff did not show a per-
foct rPcord title as against defendant's prior oral agree-
11wnt with tlw samP g-rantor but the Court said: 
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"'l'he plaintiff in ejectment mmit recove1· upon 
the strength of his own title and not upon th<• 
·weakness of his adversary's title. This rule does 
not require a plaintiff to exhibit a perfect chain 
of title as against one in wrongful possession." 
rrhe Court then held that the introduetion of a single 
deed was sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to p1·pvail 
over the defendant who gave no evidence of rPcord title. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT DOES NOT HA VE TITLE TO THE 
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE. 
Section 25-5-1, Ltah Code Annotated (1953) pro-
vides: 
"Estate or interest in real property. - No est ab" 
or interest in real property, other than leases for 
a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or 
power over or concerning real property or in any 
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted 
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than 
by act or operation of la1v, or by deed or convey-
ance in writing suhscribt>d by the party cn~ating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or dPclaring 
the same, or by his lawful agPnt tlwrt>unto antltor-
ized by writing." 
Under that statute tlwre are only two means by which 
a person can acquire an intPrest in real property: one, 
by "act or operation of law"; and two, hy a "cleed or 
conveyance in writing." Defendant clearly does not ha Ye 
a dP<:>d to the disputt>d property. No (lPPd wat:; ewr in-
troduced in evidt>nce h.\T defendant. The det>d under 
\Yhich defendant holds his own rn·orwrty was received in 
Pvidenee as plaintiff's Bxhiliit P-7. Both plaintiff's sl11'-
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veyor, 1l r. Bush and defendant's ;-rnrveyor, Mr. Coon, 
testified that the l'ast boundary lme of the description 
in said deed was the west boundary line of the property 
in dispute. (R. (i..f:, 103) 11Ir. Coon, defendant's own wit-
ness, testified at R 103, '' 'l1his area in question would 
he to the east of what we heliew the deed line to the 
\V alt on property ~would be." 
Defendant did not acquire the prnperty by act or 
operation of law. Adverse possession \Yas not established. 
8ection 78-1:2-12, l~tah Code Annotated (1953), provides: 
''Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid. -
In no case shall adverse possession be considered 
Pstablished undt>r the provisions of any section of 
this Code, unless it shall be shown that the land 
has been occupied and claimed for the period of 
seven years continuously, and that the party, his 
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes 
which have been levied and assessed upon such 
land according to law." 
There is no evidence in the record that either defendant 
or his lll'Pdt:'cessors paid any taxes assessed against the 
property. Tlw only evidence relating to taxes is plain-
tiff's Exhibit P-3, which is a paid tax notice covering 
the disputed property, addressed to Mr. Kenneth White, 
plaintiff's predecessor in interest, and Mr. \:Vhite 's testi-
111on~' that lie paid the taxes assessed for that year. 
( R. 50) 
In addition to the abO\'e, defendant did not establish 
a honndary line by acquiescence. 'l1h0 line wh1eh the 
Trial Court clPtennirn'd to he the boundary line was along 
thP chain link fenet> built by J\lr. P. L. Henderson. (Find-
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ing No. IY, R. 33) .l\lr. Henderson testifiPd that he pm-
chased the property in .February of 1960 and built the 
chain link fence later that year. (R. 83) The fence 
then was only in existence for five years prior to the 
filing of this action. In the case of King v. Fronk, 14 U. 
2d 135, 378 P. 2d 873 ( 1963), this Court held that a 
boundary line had been established between two adjoin-
ing land ovn1ers by a visibly monumented line which had 
been in existence for at least a period of twenty years. 
That holding did not appear to establish the twenty year 
period as a necessity to the doctrine; however, the Court 
did state that the seven year adverse possession period 
would be too short. The seven years is only a period of 
limitation, does not transfer title to the realty and re-
quires compliance with specific statutory standards. 
Therefore, the time necessary to establish a boundary 
line by acquiescence would have to be at least more than 
seven years. In the instant case, the monument line 
determined by the trial court to be the boundary line 
had been in existence for only five years. That is not 
enough time within which to establish a boundary by 
acquiescence. 
It is clear that defendant did not establish title to 
the property in question either by deed or conveyance 
or by act or operation of law. 
POINT III 
NO BOUNDARY LINE WAS ESTABLISHED BY 
AGREEMENT. 
The Trial Court found that in 19GO upon the building 
of the ehain link f encP by 1\1 r. P. L. Henderson, he and 
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the dt>fendant agrt>Pd that said fence was to be the boun-
dary line betwet>n their pro1>erties and that the said 
agreemt>nt did in fact establish a boundary line. (F'ind-
ings of F'act III, lV, VII, VIII, IX, R. 33-35). We submit 
neitht>r the law nor the evidence can support that con-
clusion. 
As set forth in Point II hereof, Section 25-5-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, provides the sole method by which 
an interest in real property can be created. ender that 
statute any agreement for the transfer of real property 
must be in writing. There is no such writing transferring 
disputed property to defendant in the record of this 
action. 
In the Findings cited above, the lower Court found 
a valid oral agreement. rrhe <1uestion becomes whether 
there is sufficient evidence from which to conclude that 
there was an oral agreement and, if so, whether such an 
agreement would be legally valid. 
The evidence does not support the finding of an oral 
agreement. The only mention of any agreement, was Mr. 
Henderson's testimony that he and defendant agreed to 
take down the old fences and put up a new one. (R. 83) 
Such an agreeuH:•nt \\'as necessary because one of the 
fpnces taken out belonged to the defendant and was the 
(•ast boundary line of his property. Mr. Henderson built 
the chain link fence along a line which he decided would 
:'p1·vt1 as his boundary. He actually claimed additional 
grnund ( R. 8-t-) but that he had no particular use for it. 
(H. S-t-) J\f r. Henderson also testified that he knew some 
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otht•r party had at least a right of way intPrest inmll'di-
ately to the west of his lll'Opcrt.'·, but did not know who 
the owner was. (R. 83 TherP is no tPstimony that he 
agreed that the chain link f pnce \ms also defrndant's 
boundar.''. He could not so agn-'P because hP knPw of 
othn O\rnership. Everything done in relationship to the 
chain link fencp \\·as the unilatPral act of Mr. lfrndPrson. 
He removed tlw old fence (R 83 ). He cleared the gronnd 
(R. 8:3). lie paid for the new fpn(·e ,,·ith no assistant(' 
from the defendant (R. 83). The defendant remained 
silent during the llt-riod of construction. Although this 
may he snfficiPnt evidence from which to find that l\h. 
Henderson abandoned his interest in the propert:· w<>st 
of the chain link fpnce, it is not sufficient for a finding 
of an oral agreement for the transfer of real property. 
In any event, we submit that t\\'O parties who are 
not immediately adjoining land owners and who know 
therp is a gap between their propertiPs (Finding Il, H. 
32-33) cannot agree to establish a boundary line which 
thereby results in the taking of the property of a third 
person. Plaintiff has e:,;tablishPd record title to the strip 
in question. 1\Ir. Henderson t('stifiPd that he knew sorne 
other person had at least a right of 1rny interest iu the 
disputed property. ( R. 83). Def e11cla11t 's <leecled rast 
boundary linP stops short of the rhain link fence h.'· ap-
proximately 12 ft:•(•t, a fact ddPndant km•w or at tht:• very 
lt>ast should have known. ln the faep of all these knmn1 
factors, Mr. iiendPrson and ddendant sim1)l,\' rould not 
('~;tahlish a linP \\·liieli wonl:l rPsnlt in tJw transfrring 
of the record title of plaintiff's prrdcccssor to defc·rnl-
ant. 
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In the cas<' of TriJJP c. Bagley, 7-i L 57, :27G P. 912 
( rn'.28)' this Court was faced with a 'iOmewhat similar 
problem, although the parties were adjoining land own-
ers, there being no third party owned gap as in the instant 
case. In dispute was about six acres of land to which the 
plaintiff Jwld rerord title. Defendant claimed ownership 
of tlw land by virtue of an agreement between plaintiff 
and his predecessors in interest, which agreement had 
established a boundary line placing the six acres in de-
fendant's boundaries. In discussing the law of the case, 
tho Court pointed out that where a boundary line is 
unknm\'n or uncertain, there can be a valid, oral agree-
1rn•nt establishing tht> line on tht> theory that such an 
agn•ernent does not involve a transf e1· of land, but 
only the definition of the deed under which the parties 
hold title. But in that case, the Court found that as the 
land had been surveyed, the true boundary line was cer-
tain. In finding for the plaintiff by holding that the 
agreement as to tht> boundary line was invalid, the Court 
set forth the rule, 
"\\There co-terminus land owners know the loca-
tion of the true boundary line, they may not estab-
lish a valid boundary line between their lands by 
a nwre parol agreement at a place other than the 
trne line." 'T'ri1JP v. Bagley, :276 P. 912, at 917. 
Thu reason for that rule is that where the true line is 
known an!' change in tlw line involves a transfer of land. 
ln the instant ca~w tlw trm• honndary line ·was known. 
Tlwre is ah~;olufrly no Pvidenre in the record of this 
action to support tht• 'l1rial Court's finding No. 7 (R. 34) 
thnt tl1P propc•rt)' in dispnte existed as a n•sult ''of land 
!wing inae(·m·at<'l)' sm·v<·:·ed prior to tl1c• plat being 
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made." There is no evidenct: 'lvliat1;ot•vt-r of an~· inac-
curate survey. Although the exact houndary line of Mr. 
Henderson's property may have be£~n in dispute, the east 
boundary line of defendant's property had heen sm-
veyed, described and was clearly estahlished. As testified 
to by both Mr. Bush and Mr. Coon, the defendant's east 
boundary did not include the disputed property. (R. 62, 
103). Therefore, even if the Court should find that 
there was an agreement, any such agreement would he 
invalid under the holding of Tripp r. Bagley. supra. 
Any interest Mr. Hendl::'rson may havr' had in the dis-
puted property was conYeyed by him to plaintiff's prede-
cessor by a valid Quitclaim Deed. (Ex. P. -±) 
l :..' 
Plaintiff proved that it had actual, valid, reeord titlt~ 
to the disputed property. Defendant did not prov1~ any 
title. as he did not obtain title by deed or <'.<mv1~yan<:1~ or 
by aet or operation of law. There was no agn~errwnt fill 
to the boundary line and even if th1~n~ wa.<.;, no sud1 
agreement could dt-prive plaintiff, a strang1~r to any 
agreement. of its property and for the ri~asorn; statl~d in 
Point III any such agreement would he invalid, al-\ d1~­
ft>ndant':;. true boundary line had been dearly 1~stablil-\h1~d 
prior to the time of any alleged agr''''.llll'.nt. Ttwrd<H"'~, 
th .. Court should re•erse the lower Court and quid tith~ 
tri th'=' di:,;.puted lJI'OfJPrty ll thf-' ulaintiff and J"l'.rIJaTJd th1~ 
(·a:'.'.:. :o th.:.- lo"-.,r Comi for a d"'t1·nuinati<m of plaintiff'H 
dama.zes. 
....... ' ... ___ r:;.. 
- - - - ~ . 
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Rf:'sr~etfully submitt<~d, 
('(JKE & \"I\"<:E\"T 
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